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IN THE UT AH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
V. 
SHONI PLEXICO, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
I. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPELLANT IS NOT 
INCARCERATED 
Criminal No. 131500464 
Appellate Case No. 20140590 
Trial Court Judge: G. Michael 
Westfall 
Sentencing Judge: Keith C. Barnes 
JURISDICTION 
Appellee agrees with Appellant that jurisdiction is appropriate before the Utah 
Court of Appeals, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78A-4-103(2)(e) (1953, as 
amended). 
II. 
RESOLUTION OF STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellee makes no attempt to take issue with Appellant's Statement of Facts, 
but simply as an introduction attempts to reargue the point in controversy regarding the 
underlying charge of which the Appellant was acquitted but which established the basis 
for going forward with the felony charge of witness tampering. Appellee goes to great 
lengths to argue that the Appellant fails to cite to any precedent in support of Appellant's 
assertion that mere words alone are not sufficient to support a conviction for a charge that 
has as its founding qualification a term that invites overbroad application if the same is 
interpreted to not require some outward act beyond mere words. In other words, "attempts 
to induce or otherwise cause another person to testify or infonn falsely" has not been 
clearly defined by the Court of Appeals to include mere words in the past and there is no 
such precedent primarily because this particular case is sufficiently unique to where there 
are no facts or circumstances that support Appellee 's attempted inference that the action 
taken by Appellant was all that the statute requires. In a subtle way, this is conceded by 
the Appellee in not making specific reference to the record of activity beyond that stated 
by the Appellant which involved the alleged misconduct. To that extent, the case is one of 
first impression and Appellee's attempt to argue that Appellant has failed to persuade by 
failing to cite to precedent is an acknowledgement of that point and should not be swept 
under the carpet as established by accepting Appellee's tortured restricted interpretation 
of the preservation doctrine. 
III. 
RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S ARGUMENTS 
POINT NO. l 
THE APPELLANT'S ISSUE ON APPEAL REGARDING SUFFICIENCY OF 
EVIDENCE IS PROPERLY PRESERVED. 
The Appellee makes the argument that the issue regarding sufficiency of evidence 
was not properly preserved primarily because Appellant did not argue specific points as to 
why the evidence was insufficient at the time Appellant made a motion for directed 
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verdict. A complete examination of the references to the record, of which Appellant has 
included in her brief, shows that the court was particularly keyed in on the issue in 
question not only at the time of the directed verdict but also when admonishing counsel 
on what it considered to be an appropriate argument ( an action taken by the comi 
questionable in and of itself) to admonish beforehand what defense counsel may or may 
not argue at closing, stating that it would be inappropriate for defense counsel to argue 
that the law required more than an attempt to persuade. It was based upon this frame of 
reference as well as the context of the entire trial that the Appellant moved for directed 
verdict and it was not a matter of rehashing common ground in which the record clearly 
reveals that the trial court was aware of this distinction in the facts and this is noted when 
it stated that it had listened with interest but in its mind the elements of the offense did 
not require an act which in this case would have amounted to a change that was referred 
to by counsel on making the motion. This is the same as saying that mere words alone are 
sufficient to establish the crime. That was the issue and that was addressed. For Appellee 
to attempt to qualify it by stating that it should have been argued differently and then 
raised as an exception to the preservation doctrine misrepresents the circumstances before 
the court. 
The issue was clearly before the trial court when it made its ruling and it was for 
that reason that counsel allowed the matter to be submitted rather than attempting further 
to dissuade it in its thinking. The issue has been raised. The trial court made its decision. 
3 
The trial court was well aware of the circumstances upon which counsel was contending 
that the elements of the offense have not been met by construing the statute to make it a 
crime by using mere words. 
POINT NO. 2 
SINCE COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT WAS HER ATTORNEY AT TRIAL, IT 
WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE TO ARGUE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL. 
Appellee attempts to make an extension as to how Appellant should have argued 
an exception to the preservation rule by arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. It 
would be inappropriate for counsel for Appellant to argue ineffective assistance of 
counsel when he was the one who represented the Appellant at trial. This is not a case 
involving ineffective assistance of counsel. In fact, this appears to be an attempt to simply 
argue precedent rather than key into the facts and circumstances of this particular case. 
Appellant concedes that there are points and authorities out there that apply to 
circumstances that are different than the present circumstances. However, the present 
circumstances do not warrant arguing ineffective assistance of counsel where the issue 
was preserved on appeal regarding the arguments that Appellant has made on appeal. For 
Appellee to argue matters not pertinent to the circumstances of this case is a distortion of 
that which is before the court. 
Ill 
Ill 
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POINT NO. 3 
THE APPELLEE CITES TO NO CASE LAW THAT SUPPORTS THE 
PROPOSITION THAT MERE WORDS ARE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A 
CHARGE OF WITNESS TAMPERING. 
Appellant disagrees with Appellee's assessment that the evidence the State 
produced "amply supported" a finding of attempt to induce or otherwise cause CRUZ to 
testify or infonn falsely if the following were believed: 
( 1) CRUZ initially rep011ed to Officer Triplet that Defendant shoved CRUZ to 
the ground and hit LISTER. 1-20-21, 1-50-51; 
(2) Officer Triplett cited Defendant for misdemeanor assault, Rl 80: 152; 
(3) Defendant called Officer Triplett to report that CRUZ wanted to change her 
statement, R 180: 153; and 
( 4) Defendant asked CRUZ "to lie to the cop and say that she never hit Josh 
(LISTER) R180:120-21, 153. (emphasis added) 
The Appellant takes the position that this alone is not sufficient to establish a 
charge of witness tampering if attempt to induce or otherwise cause is not construed to 
include an act that goes beyond merely asking someone to lie. Since this case does not 
support any act above and beyond the asking, the Appellant takes the position that the 
evidence is not sufficient for the charge. Since Appellee' s brief fails to allude to any other 
activity above and beyond those points asserted, it concedes that there is no such act 
apparent in the record and therefore the issue is one squarely before the Court for 
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consideration but the matter is not supported by precedent. Appellee's citation that 
evidence is sufficient to support a witness tampering conviction is not supported by State 
v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ,r 18, which simply restates the standard for plain enor under a 
sufficiency of evidence claim but involved murder and aggravated burglary. It had 
nothing to do with interpreting the phrase "to attempt to induce or otherwise cause". 
Appellee cites to no appropriate authority in this case because there is none. 
POINT NO. 4 
APPELLANT HAS ADEQUATELY BRIEFED THE ISSUE SINCE THERE IS NO 
PRECEDENT THAT ESTABLISHES THE POINT ONE WAY OR THE OTHER. 
Appellee attempts to argue that the Appellant has failed to follow Rule 24, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, in presenting substantive arguments by not citing to 
controlling authority to support the argument as though such points and authorities 
existed. Appellee makes no attempt to cite to points and authorities that would otherwise 
be controlling but restates the position stated by Appellant and without further argument 
even points out that a statute is unconstitutionally overbroad when it prohibits a 
substantial amount of protected speech. Appellee does so without addressing the matter as 
to why the speech in this case is not protected, a position not supported by controlling 
authority. Appellee attempts to assert that use of the word "induce" in the statute clearly 
indicates that it applies to verbal as well as physical interference with a witness. In this 
case, there was no such interference which connotes an act above and beyond simply 
asking someone to lie for them. State v. Carlson, 638 P.2d 512, 515 (Utah 1981 ), 
6 
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involved conduct supportive of an inducement which is not found in the present case. 
Appellee argues that Appellant should have made a point of distinguishing such case even 
though the case predated the present version of the law. The points made by Appellant are 
adequate and appropriate to address the issue at hand without having to cite to authority 
that no longer applies due to such change. 
POINT NO. 5 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN EXCLUDING 
APPELLANT'S ASSAULT ACQUITTAL. 
Appellee misses the point entirely with regard to the issue of advising the jury of 
Appellant's acquittal of the underlying charges. The point is that the trial court did not 
make an evaluation of the circumstances based on the rules of evidence. There was no 
analysis made and no consideration given where if such would have been done it is likely 
the evidence would have been admitted had the Appellant been convicted of the charge. 
However, in this case, the trial court did not make the proper assessment but simply 
concluded that such evidence would be inadmissible. Any evaluation of the circumstances 
pursuant to the Rules of Evidence, particularly Rule 404, would have concluded 
differently. Moreover, the matter is not one simply involving the discretion of the trial 
court without a determination or finding that such in some way would have been 
prejudicial to the State. The infonnation was clearly relevant and it was probative to the 
issue at hand. There is nothing in the record to suggest that such information would have 
been prejudicial to the State and this in and of itself distorts the basis for such 
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consideration in the first place. The Appellant contends that while the issue of evidence 
being less probative than prejudicial against a Defendant is an appropriate consideration 
for trial, the State is not entitled to have evidence not admitted on the same basis. The 
Appellant is not aware of a single case that attempts to apply Rule 404 in the manner that 
the trial court infers which is that information regarding a defendant's acquittal would be 
prejudicial to the State in attempting to convict a defendant of witness tampering. The 
very thought of such application is absurd. This is by any definition an abuse of discretion 
on the part of the trial court in not properly addressing the matter in context, considering 
it in light of the defendant being prejudiced by not allowing such infonnation is what 
should have been assessed but was not. For Appellee to argue that such infonnation was 
not relevant is to ignore Rules 40 I and 402, Utah Rules of Evidence, which state clearly 
that evidence is relevant if it has a tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence. The comments made by the juror that came forward 
clearly show that the issue was one that the jury in its deliberation thought was relevant 
and to argue otherwise is to again ignore the underlying facts and circumstances of this 
case. 
Ill 
Ill 
Ill 
Ill 
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POINT NO. 6 
THE INSTRUCTION OFFERED BY THE COURT ADMITTING ASSAULT 
EVIDENCE WITHOUT ADVISING THE JURY OF ACQUITTAL ALLOWED 
THE JURY TO DRAW AN UNREASONABLE INFERENCE AS TO ITS RESULT 
WHICH PREJUDICED THE JURY IN THEIR DELIBERATION 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE INSTRUCTION TO NOT CONSIDER SUCH 
ACCORDINGLY. 
Appellee misses the point with regard to the instruction that was given at trial that 
improperly allowed an inference of conviction under circumstances where the jury was 
entitled to know whether the defendant had been convicted of the underlying charge as 
part of their deliberation. To allow such prejudiced the Appellant. The trial court refused 
to submit the instruction provided by defense counsel because it believed that the State 
would be prejudiced by informing the jury of the acquittal. The State is not entitled to 
such non-prejudicial consideration. This is not going to be a matter that has precedent 
because it is a distortion of the application of the Rule. The Rule is not designed to 
consider whether or not the State is prejudiced by submitting information regarding an 
acquittal of an underlying charge that is relevant and material to the jury's deliberation. 
Had the instruction been given offered by Appellant at trial, the jury would not have been 
allowed to speculate about the Appellant having been convicted of the underlying 
charges. 
Ill 
Ill 
Ill 
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POINT NO. 7 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL. 
Appellee attempts to argue that the motion for new trial was unfounded because it 
was based upon infonnation that was inadmissible. In fact, the affidavit is part of the 
record and there has been no ruling of inadmissibility. The State did not oppose the 
affidavit in its argument and submitted no points and authorities for such proposition. To 
assume that the information was inadmissible, goes beyond that which is in the record. 
The motion for new trial was appropriate also based upon the ruling of the trial court to 
deny infonnation regarding the acquittal and the opportunity presented itself because it 
was before a different judge to consider such ruling. The new trial court judge denied the 
same without such consideration. Appellee's attempt to argue the precedent set forth in 
Rule 606 fails to recognize that there is no underlying determination made by the trial 
court to exclude such evidence that was made a part of the record. The issue of its 
admissibility is one that should be made at the trial court level and not second guessed on 
appeal without having the opportunity to address such matters before the trial court. 
POINT NO. 8 
THE APPELLEE ATTEMPTS TO BLAME THE APPELLANT FOR THE 
IMPROPER INFERENCE THAT THE JURY WAS LED TO BELIEVE THAT 
THE APPELLANT WAS CONVICTED OF ASSAULT. 
The Appellee seems to take the position that it is Appellant's fault for allowing the 
jury to infer that she had been convicted by eliciting infonnation that was part of the facts 
10 
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and circumstances of the case. Trial should not be a game of hide and seek. The facts are 
what they are. The issue is not one of what infonnation should be kept from the jury but 
rather allowing the jury to receive relevant information in proper context. The jury in this 
case was denied the opportunity to consider all the evidence in its proper light by being 
denied the opportunity to be informed of the resulting acquittal of the charges. The 
evidence introduced by Appellant on cross examination and as part of her defense were 
relevant because it was part of the case just as it was relevant for the jury to be properly 
admonished as to whether or not she was convicted or acquitted of the underlying charges 
without being instructed in such a way for them to improperly infer that she had been 
convicted when she had not. That is in fact the issue before the Court and the reason why 
the admonition given by the trial court in this case was not appropriate. The Appellant is 
not complaining about the evidence that was presented at trial, the Appellant is 
complaining about a key piece of evidence that was not allowed to be presented at trial. 
Therefore, Salt Lake City v. Williams, 2005 UT App 493 does not apply to the 
circumstances of this case. 
POINT NO. 9 
THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED THE OPPORTUNITY OF IMPEACHING THE 
WITNESS WHO IN THIS CASE WAS HER ONLY ACCUSER BASED UPON 
INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS AT THE PREVIOUS TRIAL. 
The Appellee attempts to argue that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
this matter because it invited counsel for Appellant to address issues of impeachment in 
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other areas. However, the Appellant asserts that the basis upon which the trial court ruled 
disallowing the inquiry of impeachment sought by the Appellant is inappropriate and 
Appellee cites to no authority to the contrary. Rather, Appellee takes the position of 
admonishing this Court to decline from addressing the matter because it its view 
Appellant should have argued plain error when in fact the issue was preserved at the trial 
court level and has been set forth in Appellant's brief. The issue is not one of what the 
trial court thought to be reasonable areas of inquiry for impeachment purposes but rather 
whether or not the trial court was correct in disallowing the inquiry made by Appellant at 
trial. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in not allowing such inquiry and this 
should not be compromised by the fact that counsel for Appellant did not follow the line 
of inquiry that the trial court suggested was open for impeachment. The issue of trial 
court discretion is not one of whether invited areas of cross-examination are offered but 
that which the trial court ruled upon in denying the Appellant the opportunity to impeach 
the witness as it deemed necessary. 
POINT NO.10 
THE APPELLANT DID NOT INVITE ERROR IN THE ELEMENTS 
INSTRUCTION. 
Counsel for Appellant' response for the court's own inquiry as to whether there 
was an objection is to say that there was none. However, counsel for Appellant did not 
offer the instruction and that which was given was not sufficient. This is not enough to 
assert that the failure to object alone is sufficient to invite error to an instruction given by 
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the com1. The circumstances of State v. Geukgeuzian are distinguishable for the reasons 
set forth in Appellant's initial brief and the position in that case should not be applied in 
this case due to that distinction. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
On the grounds and for the reasons set forth above, counsel for Appellant prays 
that this Court reverse or remand as it deems appropriate together with such other and 
further relief as to it ap7 equitabl~ _ and proper. ~ 
DA TED this ft,- day of~-+-----=~' 26/6 
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